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1 The purpose of this article is to offer a new periodization of Jewish philosophy and to
reflect  on  the  definition  of  Jewish  philosophy.  It  will  therefore  deal  with  the
characteristic  style of  each Jewish philosophy rather than with their  content.  I  shall
identify  three  moments  in  the  history  of  Jewish  philosophy:  the  Arab  moment,  the
German moment, and the analytic moment; this last moment, largely unknown, will be
studied more in depth. This paper does not aim to present an exhaustive panorama or a
representative synthesis of the history of Jewish philosophy. The selected authors and
concepts are mentioned here because they give us the opportunity to reflect  on the
nature and the function of Jewish philosophy in a new light. 
 
What is the Philosophy of Judaism? 
2 The German Enlightenment in the 18th century invented the historigraphic category of
“Jewish  philosophy”  (Westerkamp 2008:  536).  The  kind  of  authors  one  fits  into  that
category depends on one’s definition of Jewish philosophy.1 To define the latter, one may
ask what characterizes  Jewish philosophy within the general  field of  philosophy.2 To
answer that question, Raphael Jospe distinguishes two approaches (Jospe 1997: 113-114
and Jospe 2008: 19-33): the essentialist and the formalist approaches. According to the
essentialist approach, there exists an essential core of Judaism, which Jewish philosophy
would explain and rationalize.  According to Jospe,  Julius  Guttmann and Colette Sirat
share this approach. Guttmann thought that the distinctiveness of Jewish philosophy was
its  religious  orientation.3 Sirat  explains  that  Jewish  philosophy  does  not  come  from
Jewish sources but that it is specific in that it strives to harmonize philosophy and the
Jewish tradition (Jospe 2008: 20). According to this essentialist model, Jewish philosophy
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should not only focus on religious questions; it must also agree with the “Jewish religious
tradition”  and  that  is  the  reason why neither  Guttmann nor  Sirat  included  Spinoza
among the Jewish philosophers – at the most,  Guttmann wrote about the influence of
Jewish  philosophy  on  the  author  of  The  Ethics.  The  formalist  approach  rejects  this
essentialism because it is too narrow but also because it is marred by an unacceptable
flaw: it is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Someone who believes that Judaism has an
essence inevitably dissects texts into Jewish and non-Jewish elements, an operation that is
neither feasible nor useful; moreover, this prescriptive approach favors value judgments. 
3 Formalism can be divided into two types. Extreme formalism calls Jewish philosophy any
philosophy produced by a  Jewish person,  whatever  the definition given for  “Jewish”
(Jospe 1997:  113).  According to  moderate  formalism,  with which Jospe identifies  and
which  Judah  Ha-Levi  prefigured,  Jospe  says,  the  Jewish  identity  of  the  author  is  a
necessary condition but does not suffice.  As Jospe explains,  a Jew who plays football
doesn’t  make  it  a  Jewish  football.  Extreme  formalism  is  obviously  untenable  in  the
following situation: in the case that a philosopher realized at the end of his career that he
was Jewish, according to extreme formalism, this would retroactively turn his work into a
contribution to Jewish philosophy. These two absurd examples prove that the criterion
used  by  extreme  formalism  to  define  Jewish  philosophy  is  insufficient.  Moderate
formalists include reading and referring to Jewish sources or addressing Jewish issues as
the other necessary factors to define a philosophy as Jewish. While essentialism focuses
on the Jewish content, moderate formalism rather takes into account the Jewish context.
This moderate formalist  definition is quite broad and I  wish to turn my attention to
another  seemingly  narrower  one.  In  an  article  I  will  analyze  further  below,  Yitzhak
Melamed suggests the following definition:
“Unlike many others, I do not take a Jewish philosopher to be someone who
is (a) Jewish and (b) a philosopher, but rather suggest that Jewish philosophy is
the attempt to provide a well-argued and informed account of Jewish religious and
cultural beliefs and practices.” (Melamed 2009: 176)
4 This  definition elicits  two comments.  The first  one is  about  the connection between
philosophy and Judaism: I will concentrate on the manner by which Jewish philosophers
have used non-Jewish philosophies in order to solve problems they had from the start. In
other words, I will not examine so much the way Jews answered philosophical questions
but  rather  the  way  they  dealt  with  internal  issues  by  resorting  to  the  Greek,  Arab,
German, or other philosophical methods. The question is then to what extent general
philosophy  was  useful  to  the  Jews,  even  though  the  Jews  also  contributed  to  the
elaboration of general philosophy – and sometimes even did so without any reference to
the Talmudic texts or any other identified Jewish source. 
5 The second comment has to do with the study of the Talmud and with the opposition
between  the  conceptualist  and  the  critical  approaches.4 The  conceptualist  approach
deliberately  disdains  historical  reality  and  the  historian’s  methods.  A  rejection  of
historical depth isn’t necessarily the product of ignorance and may be the result of a
hermeneutical  choice.  The  texts  are  all  brought  to  the  same  level,  as  if  forming  a
synchronic and homogenous whole. This approach prevails in the study of the Talmud in
the traditional world of the yeshivot. Philosophically speaking, conceptualism is not an
error but historically speaking, it is inaudible. The critical approach takes into account
the history of  the texts,  their  modification over  time,  their  successive editions.  This
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critical  approach  is  philosophically  and  historically  receivable.  But  from  the
conceptualist’s  point of  view,  a text of  Jewish philosophy does not have to meet the
criteria of the critical approach. 
6 The definition of Jewish philosophy I have just given isn’t meant to state what Jewish
philosophy  essentially is  or  should  be  but  rather  offers  a  new way  of  measuring  its
evolution. Emphasizing the fundamental place of the Talmud leads me to select specific
authors and not others in my three-fold study. Most histories of Jewish philosophy divide
it  into the Greek,  the Arab,  and the German periods.5 The periodization I  propose is
guided by another choice. While the contribution of analytic philosophy is more often
than not overlooked – mainly because of the scarcity of the texts currently available – the
latter will here be reviewed with some attention. 
 
The Arab Moment
7 I shall now describe briefly and synthetically the Arab moment, with the sole purpose to
draw the reader’s attention to the role the profane (i.e. non-Jewish) philosophy played in
Jewish philosophy.  The Jewish and the Arab philosophies emerged at the same time,
around the 9th and the 10th centuries. In fact, Jewish philosophy first developed in Arabic.
Hebrew became the Jewish philosophy’s main language only later, after Maimonides. In
its  earliest  stages,  Arabic-speaking  Jewish  philosophers  quoted  many  non-Jewish
philosophers; ibn Gabirol didn’t mention any Jewish theme in his Fons Vitae and this text
was thought to be Christian until the 19th century (Hughes 2011: 1005). Gradually, the
Jewish philosophers produced enough material to work without referring frequently and
directly  (in  Arabic)  to  authors  from  other  religions.  Which  authors  did  the  Jewish
philosophers study? In a letter, Maimonides recommends one to read Aristotle, Alexander
of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Averroes, as well as Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Ibn Bajja
(Harvey 2003: 263). Now it is only through selected texts translated into Hebrew that
post-Maimonides philosophers had access to these authors. 
8 One  of  the  pivotal  events  in  Medieval  Jewish  philosophy  is  the  appearance  of
Aristotelianism.  The latter  became known to the Arab philosophic circles  in the 10th
century but became the dominant paradigm in Jewish philosophy only in the mid-12th
century (Hugues 2011: 1006). Even when tinged with Neo-Platonism, Aristotelianism is a
philosophy, which is based on a certain view of the world on the one hand, and which
offers analytical tools that are still relevant today, for some of them. Jewish philosophy is
influenced both by the Aristotelian view of the world (which does not have unanimous
support)  and  by  a  number  of  Aristotelian  concepts  which  are  to  a  certain  extent
independent of a given view of the world. Indeed, Aristotle theorized universals at the
foundation of science – the concept of definition, among others. The mere theorization of
definition  by  genus  and  differentia  did  not  influence  so  much  the  theses  found  in
Medieval Jewish literature but the style of its authors.  To better explain this point,  I
would  like  to  compare  briefly  an  aspect  of  Talmudic  literature  and  Aristotelian
philosophy.  The  exceptional  technical  nature  of  Talmudic  literature  stands  out;  yet,
before  their  encounter  with  Aristotelian  philosophy,  Talmudic  thinkers  lacked  a
structured  theory  of  the  definition.  This  is  not  surprising  since  the  definition  is  a
universal concept (just like the genus, the differentia, the accidental) and the Talmud
does not explicitly theorize universals. Gradually, however, the definition became one of
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the  tools  with  which  Jewish  philosophers  formulated  problems  raised  in  Talmudic
literature.
9 The Arab moment therefore inspired Jewish philosophy, which dealt with two types of
issues:  the  issues  inherent  in  the  Greco-Arab  philosophy,  which  the  Jewish  thinkers
attempted  to  solve;  and  the  typical  Talmudic  questions  they  formulated  thanks  to
Aristotelian concepts.  Rather than drawing up a fruitless taxonomy of  the issues the
philosophers dealt with and classifying them, I will simply sum up the Arab moment as
the encounter between two literary genres (the Talmudic one and the philosophic one)
that inspired and enriched each other.
 
The German Moment
10 One cannot skip from the middle of the Arabic Middle-Ages to the German 17th century
without  mentioning  the  fact  that  between these  two periods,  the  Jewish  philosophy
underwent many changes, which I will not recall. I wish to clarify the title of this subpart:
the “German moment” includes at least two types of literary genres – the traditional
German Jewish philosophy and the science of Judaism. The latter is the application of
historical  and philological  concepts  to  Jewish texts.  This  critical  method adopted by
Judeo-German scholars did not aim to solve conceptual Talmudic problems (conceptual
approach) in particular; it rather attempted to understand the historical development of
this literature, its passing down, and the evolution of its vocabulary (critical approach).
The science of Judaism thus benefited the History and Literary History departments more
than the Philosophy department.  In general,  the science of  Judaism has some of  the
characteristics of the critical approach but none of the conceptual one. 
11 As  for  Jewish  philosophy,  it  seems  that  it  overall  assimilated  the  contemporary
philosophical  notions  to  the  point  that  it  took  part  in  the  debates  that  divided  the
German philosophers.  Thus,  the majority of  the Jewish philosophers took a stand on
Hegel’s philosophy,6 either because they were Hegelian or because they had become anti-
Hegelian, at the times when most of the German philosophers themselves were Hegelian
and then anti-Hegelian. Krochmal’s philosophy is Hegelian (Adlerblum 1917: 184) while
Lévinas’ is anti-Hegelian.7 Rosenzweig, a specialist of Hegel’s philosophy, played a pivotal
role between the Jewish Hegelian and non-Hegelian philosophers.8 More generally, the
Jewish philosophers experienced “a rupture which borders on parricide”: that of Kant for
Hermann Cohen, of Hegel for Rosenzweig, and of Heidegger for Lévinas9 (Nordmann 2007:
247). The image of the parricide is relevant and the metaphor can be extended to explain
the extent to which Lévinas is the spiritual son and heir of these thinkers he sometimes
disputes. Parricide has always been a family affair.
12 What  has  this  German  moment  become?  Just  like  German  philosophy  (Kantianism,
German Idealism, German Romanticism, Existentialism, and Phenomenology) found in
France a  new fertile  ground,  the center  of  gravity of  the German Jewish philosophy
moved there.10 In fact,  the French Jewish philosophy is German in many respects:  its
relationship – however strained it is – with Hegelianism fits it by right in general French
philosophy (Janicaud 1992, Lellouche 2006). The question as to what makes it a Jewish
philosophy then arises. 
13 Today, the figure of Lévinas enjoys much consideration. After the Second World War in
particular,  this  philosopher  who  first  studied  phenomenology  strove  to  expound
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Talmudic passages in the light of phenomenology11. Now Talmudic literature is close to
the Anglo-Saxon pragmatism (Adlerblum 1917: 187-189) as much as it is remote from the
concerns  of  Germanophile  philosophers.  Reading  the  Talmud  with  the  help  of  the
categories  of  German  Idealism,  of  Phenomenology,  or  of  Existentialism  is  a  daring
intellectual enterprise; but I wonder if by reading Lévinas, one doesn’t better understand
Husserl or Heidegger than the questions raised by the Talmud before it was read through
the lens of philosophy. 
14 Lévinas was criticized in different ways for his contributions to various fields. To the field
of general philosophy: in his book Difficile Levinas. Peut-on ne pas être levinassien ?, Raphaël
Lellouche blames Lévinas for subverting the Buberian idea of the dialogue between the I
and Thou (Lellouche 2006: 74-78) and for delivering unusable and inhuman ethics12. To
the field of the philosophy of Judaism, more specifically:  we must admit that Lévinas
placed the study of the Talmud at the center of his Jewish philosophy. I shall nevertheless
quote the criticism Melamed directs not only to Lévinas, but to the majority of modern
Jewish philosophers – with the exception of Salomon Maimon: 
“The reality for modern Jewish philosophy was that most of its participants
were  either  good  philosophers  (Spinoza  and  Cohen) or  well  informed  in
Jewish texts (Mendelssohn, Krochmal, Soloveitchik), though unfortunately in
many  cases  they  were  neither  Jewishly  informed  nor  good  philosophers.
Maimon’s case, however, provides some hope for a better future for modern
Jewish philosophy.”13 (Melamed 2009: 186-187)
15 Generally,  Melamed  reproaches  modern  Jewish  philosophers14 for  adopting  the
opposition between Christian universalism and Jewish particularism; and for reducing
religious literature to the Bible as did, mutatis mutandis, the Protestant theologians –“with
the exception of two or three figures (primarily Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, and Levinas)”
(Melamed 2009: 176 and 181). The harshness of Melamed’s judgment is partly due to the
fact that he includes in “modern Jewish philosophy” only continental authors. It is high
time we broaden this category and add analytic philosophers, following Jed Lewinsohn’s
invitation (Lewinsohn 2007: 97-99).
16 During the German moment of Jewish philosophy, more than in its Arab period, Judaism
became somewhat secondary: more often than not, the Jewish authors first contributed to
general philosophy and only later did they address issues having to do with Judaism.
While  the Jewish thinkers  of  Arab philosophy enlisted the latter  to  help them solve
Talmudic problems – to apologetic ends, at times – the Jewish philosophers of the German
moment took the opposite direction by trying to provide a Jewish answer to the questions
and the issues at the heart of the German Christian philosophy.
 
The Analytic Moment
17 In order to understand the nature of the analytic moment, the genesis of this philosophic
genre must be briefly recalled. Analytic philosophy opposes continental philosophy15 – its
Hegelian and post-Hegelian currents of  thought,  in particular –  and intends to solve
philosophical  problems  through  language  analysis.16 Two main  currents  coexist  in
analytic philosophy; what differentiates between them is the relative importance they
attach to  ordinary  language  as  the  ultimate  arbitrator  in  philosophical  debates.  The
adepts of the philosophy of ordinary language find in the latter a material that enables
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them to explain and clear up philosophic problems. For the more logic-driven current,
ordinary language – at least in the way we know it to function – cannot assume such a
predominant  role:  philosophical  skepticism  always  favored  a  careful  formulation  of
propositions in order to “regiment” ordinary language, as Quine says.
18 Analytic philosophy presents itself in terms of problems and solutions, like the rest of
science, in fact. Analytic philosophy does not offer specific theses and is neutral with
regards to political, religious, or ontological currents. Thinkers of analytic philosophy
thus include nominalists, idealists, atheists, believers, and followers of all opinions and
theses.  What connects analytic philosophers is a specific criterion of stylistic quality:
precise argumentation. A great analytic philosopher is not an author whose intuition
inspired him to see something; the great analytic philosopher is the one who argues best
and who answers to objections in the clearest  and most  convincing manner.  Indeed,
clarity is a gold standard of quality in analytic philosophy. It goes without saying that for
analytic philosophy, obscure philosophical utterances are unacceptable and constitute in
no way a sign of profundity. Analytic philosophy can actually be viewed as the product of
a reaction to continental philosophy or as a return to the pre-Hegelian philosophic style.
Assuredly, Descartes’ answers to the objections raised to his metaphysical meditations
display the same features as those characterizing analytic philosophy.
19 The authors that apply analytic philosophy to Talmudic disputations don’t always come
from the Philosophy departments;17 they are active notably in the fields of mathematics
and physics. I shall quote a few of them, without claiming to provide an exhaustive list.
Philosopher and mathematician Curtis Franks is an expert on Hilbert and Gödel; he calls
upon mathematics to shed light on a rather complex controversy about the relative force
of four types of arguments (Franks 2012): between four types of traditional arguments in
Talmudic literature, Franks attempts to determine which ones are likely to bring forth
conclusions that may serve as the premise to new reasoning.18 Josef Stern uses the
notions developed by Nelson Goodman to analyze the Jewish rituals that are relevant
from the legal (halakhic) point of view (Stern 1987). Goodman’s semiotics is based on a
distinction  between  various  modes  of  reference:  denotation,  exemplification,  and
expression.19
20 Eli Hirsch, who was researching and teaching on the problem of identity in metaphysics,
thought that the ideas he was expounding could not be easily exemplified and had no
practical significance: the image of the wooden ship whose planks are gradually replaced
is indeed tangible but does not matter as long as no one claims ownership of the boat or
of  the  planks.  He  therefore  went  back  to  study  the  Talmud.  According  to  him,  the
Talmudists “are among the most analytical people on earth” (Hirsch 1999: 176). He then
managed  to  provide  concrete  examples  for  extremely  abstract  problems  of  analytic
philosophy. In fact, in the work of Eli Hirsch, the Talmudic disputation sheds light on
metaphysical  issues  and  vice-versa.  Hirsch  undertook  a  very  difficult  task  and  he
succeeded: he managed to draw the attention of two very different kinds of readers, who
learned about a field they did not know about. 
21 Moshe Koppel deserves a special mention. This author opens his remarkable book Meta-
halakha. Logic, Intuition and the Unfolding of Jewish Law (Koppel 1997) on a central question
of the philosophy of halakha (Jewish law): does all of what we call halakha derive from the
principles given at Mount Sinai? This issue is quite sensitive as both answers, though in
contradiction with each other, seem right: 
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“Confronted  with  that  question,  most  Orthodox  Jews  feel  profoundly
uncomfortable giving an answer. On the one hand, one would like to say that
everything  was  given  to  Moshe  on  Mount  Sinai  and  that  after  that  the
development of Halakha is just a matter of unfolding. One may qualify this
answer by adding that although, to be sure, the Jews in those days did not
have,  for  instance,  electricity,  the  principles  given  at  Mount  Sinai  were
sufficiently  broad  and  well-defined  that  we  can  derive  the  laws  about
electricity  from  them.  Indeed,  this  response  sounds  like  the  ‘religiously
correct’ thing to say.'
On the other hand, one would also want to defend the opposite view, namely,
that  Halakha  is  constantly  being  renewed  and  that  scholars  in  every
generation can add their own insights and interpretations. Great scholars,
who have the power to interpret, add something novel to Halakha. Thus, in
some sense, to say that Halakha develops beyond what was given at Sinai is
also  religiously  correct.  Moreover,  the  mere  existence  of  disputes  would
seem  to  be  incontrovertible  proof  that  Halakha  cannot  be  derived  in  a
mechanical fashion from what happened at Mount Sinai; had it been, there
would  be  nothing  to  argue  about.  These  disputes  clearly  show  that  the
manner  in  which  Halakha  unfolds  depends  very  much  upon  how  it  is
interpreted.” (Koppel 1997: 3-4)
22 This passage elicits a few comments. Firstly, the author speaks from within Judaism –
Orthodox Judaism,  what’s  more.  While  anyone who takes  a  philosophical  interest  in
Judaism generally addresses the topics of the Holocaust, the Jewish condition, or Jewish
humor, Koppel raises an issue related to halakha and wishes to account for Orthodox
Judaism.  The way Koppel  tackles  the  subject  may seem naïve  to  anyone who is  not
familiar with analytic philosophy: a text that includes a contradiction is awfully flawed,
while  the oxymoron is  one of  the most  common philosophical  device  in  continental
philosophy. Koppel is well aware of the fact that the question can be answered in two
opposite ways and he explicates the nature of this opposition in the most unequivocal
terms.
23 Secondly, Koppel mentions right away the existence of disputes between the Talmudic
sages as one of the elements in favor of one answer over the other: the one that contests
the  fact  that  all  halakha derived  from  the  principles  given  at  Mount  Sinai.  The
disagreements between the protagonists in the Talmud are highlighted in the first page
of Koppel’s work. Once more, the opposition to continental philosophy is obvious: while
otherness is a celebrated concept in the anti-Hegelian continental philosophy – notably in
Lévinas’ thought – the lack of agreement is showed to be if not an anomaly at least a
problem Koppel intends to solve. 
24 In order to solve the antinomy between the one-time gift of the entire halakha at Mount
Sinai and its ongoing development over time, Koppel uses several concepts defined in
philosophy and mathematics,  such as  unpredictability,  determinism,  autonomy,  over-
interpretation,  under-interpretation,  modelability,  artificial  intelligence,  and
computability.
“We now have the tools  to formulate the central  thesis  of  this  book:  the
fundamental  ideas  of  Judaism  can  be  understood  in  the  light  of  the
assumption that the process by which Halakha is generated is autonomous,
that the Halakha generated is not modelable.”20 (Koppel 1997: 34)
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25 Without delving into a detailed demonstration,  let  us recall  that autonomy combines
consistency and unpredictability. Halakha developed both consistently and unpredictably.
Indeed, if this process were consistent without being unpredictable, the novel conclusions
coming  out  of  the  Talmudic  debates  would  be  pointless.  If  on  the  contrary  the
development of the halakha were unpredictable without a minimum of consistency, we
would lose sight of the fact that this development derives from the principles given at
Mount Sinai.
26 Koppel’s  reflection is  meta-halakhic in that  it  raises epistemological  questions at  the
foundation of the legal interpretation process in halakha. We can describe his approach in
brief as a philosophy of law applied to Talmudic law and equipped with tools produced by
analytic philosophy and mathematics. 
27 Koppel also wrote about the way the Talmudic sages deal with uncertainty, in the cases in
which the judge does not have all the necessary information in order to pass a judgment.
Koppel  compared  different  types  of  statements  that  include  probabilities:  classic
probabilities, frequency probability, and subjective probability. Contrasting the various
statements  enables  the  author  to  analyze  more  thoroughly  the  different  types  of
probabilities outlined in the Talmud (Koppel 2003). Koppel’s highly articulate prose helps
the reader grasp both the Talmudic legal processes and the mathematical concepts. Many
mathematicians also study the Talmud but do not use their knowledge in each field to
enrich the other. Koppel, on the contrary, draws from both fields and offers the reader a
text  whose  content  is  certainly  difficult,  but  made  easier  by  Koppel’s  exceptional
pedagogy. 
28 Many other authors and texts of analytic philosophy should be mentioned here (notably
Menachem  Fisch,  Jed  Lewinsohn,  Aaron  Segal,  Samuel  Lebens,  Michael  Abraham’s
numerous  works  in  Hebrew,  as  well  as  the  journal  Higayon,  whose  articles  focus  on
Talmudic logic). Moreover, several unpublished texts, written among others by authors
quoted in this article, circulate and elicit comments and scholarly debates. In the future,
these  articles  might  well  come  out  in  print  after  successfully  passing  the  test  that
characterizes analytic philosophy: criticism of argumentation.21
29 Argumentation  has  indeed  become  the  predominant  characteristic  trait  of  analytic
philosophy, distinguishing the latter from previous moments in Jewish philosophy. More
than in its German and Arab moments, the Jewish philosophy of the analytic moment
centers on the Talmud and uses the philosophic and scientific literature in order to solve
problems raised in the Talmudic text. In this case, philosophy serves the conceptual study
of the Talmud. Conclusion
30 The history of  philosophy seems to evolve in recurrent cycles:  in the beginning,  the
authors get to know the texts and the notions produced by the surrounding philosophy;
then, the dialogue with the inspirational source recedes and gives way to an internal
research which sometimes ends – at the close of the cycle – with a relentless commentary
of Jewish thinkers no more related to the inspiring authors.
31 The analytic Jewish philosophy is in its early stages. No one knows how it will look like in
the future. Rightly or wrongly, some have said that the continental Jewish philosophy has
come to an end (Melamed 2009) or doesn’t exist any more.
32 If  both the continental and the analytic philosophies shared the same goal,  we could
attempt to determine which one reaches it best. This is not the case, however, and it
would be fruitless to agree with one over the other. On the other hand, we can rightfully
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ask ourselves what we want tomorrow’s Jewish philosophy to look like: do we want Jewish
philosophy to be as profound as the Franco-German Christian philosophy, with texts we
still need to fully understand? Or do we favor a philosophical style that highlights clarity
and inventiveness in its argumentation?22 In any case, if we go by the assumption that one
of the objectives of Jewish philosophy is to shed a new light on the Talmudic literature –
and this assumption is not an imperative – the analytic philosophy obviously constitutes
a good tool.23 Finally, as Eli Hirsch shows, we might well get a better understanding of the
arduous questions of analytic philosophy thanks to the relatively concrete cases found in
the  Talmud.  In  terms  of  literary  genre,  though  Talmudic  literature  and  analytic
philosophy  come  from  two  very  different  worlds,  they  share  a  characteristic:
argumentation is fundamental.24 A new literary genre may be seeing the light of the day.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abraham, Michael, Gabbay, Dov M. et Schild, Uri J.
2009   « Analysis of the Talmudic Argumentum A Fortiori Inference Rule Kal Vachomer using
Matrix Abduction », Studia Logica, 2009/92, pp. 281-364. 
Abraham, Michael, Gabbay, Dov M, Hazut, Gabriel, Maruvka, Yosef E. et Schild, Uri
2011   « Logical Analysis of the Talmudic Rules of General and Specific (Klalim-u-Pratim), History
and Philosophy of Logic Special Issue : Modern Review of Judaic Logic, 32/1, pp. 47-62.
Adlerblum, Nima
1917   « A Reinterpretation of Jewish Philosophy », Journal of Philosophy and Scientific Methods,
14/7, pp. 181-189.
Benoist, Jocelyn
2001   Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie
analytique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
Bensussan, Gérard
2001   « Qu’est-ce qu’une philosophie ‘nationale’ ? Notes sur la philosophie ‘juive’ », Revue de
métaphysique et de morale, 2001/3, pp. 383-397 
Bourel, Dominique
2004   Moses Mendelssohn. La naissance du judaïsme moderne, Gallimard, Paris.
Dummett, Michael
1993   Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Harvard.
Engel, Pascal
1997   La Dispute. Une introduction à la philosophie analytique, Minuit, « Paradoxe », Paris. 
Fagenblat, Michael
2008   « Ethics and Halakha in Levinas », Shofar. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies, 26/4,
pp. 97-119.
Three Moments in Jewish Philosophy
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 22 | 2011
9
Frank Daniel H. et Leaman, Oliver (éds)
2003   The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Franks, Curtis
2012   « The Realm of the Sacred, Wherein We May Not Draw an Inference from Something which
Itself Has Been Inferred: A Reading of Talmud Bavli Zevachim Folio 50 », History and Philosophy of
Logic, 33/1, pp. 69-86.
Guttmann, Julius
1994   Histoire des philosophies juives. De l’époque biblique à Franz Rosenzweig, traduit de l’anglais par
Sylvie Courtine-Denamy, Gallimard, « Bibliothèque de philosophie » Paris, [1933].
Harvey, Steven
2003   « Arabic into Hebrew: The Hebrew translation movement and the influence of Averroes
upon medieval Jewish thought » in Frank Daniel H. et Leaman, Oliver (éds) The Cambridge
Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 258-280. 
Harvey, Steven
2007   « The Value of Julius Guttmann’s Die Philosophie des Judentums for Understanding
Medieval Jewish Philosophy Today », Studies in Hebrew Literature and Jewish Culture Amsterdam
Studies in Jewish Philosophy, Volume 12, pp. 297-308.
Hayoun, Maurice-Ruben
2005   L’identité juive et la conscience européenne. Sachons préserver notre héritage commun, Armand
Colin, « Pocket », Paris.
2008   Les Lumières de Cordoue à Berlin. Une histoire intellectuelle du judaïsme, Armand Colin,
« Pocket », Paris, (2 volumes).
Hirsch, Eli
1999   « Identity in the Talmud », Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1999/23, pp. 166-180.
2006   « Rashi’s View of the Open Future: Indeterminateness and Bivalence », Zimmerman, Dean
(éd) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, pp. 111-135.
Hughes, Aaron W.
2011   « Jewish Philosophy », in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. 
Philosophy between 500 and 1500, Springer, Dordrecht /Heidelberg /London /New York,
pp. 1003-1010.
Husik, Isaac
1916   A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, The Macmillan Company, New York.
Janicaud, Dominique
1992   Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française, L’éclat, « Tiré à part », Paris.
Jospe, Raphael
1997   « Teaching Judah Ha-Levi: Defining and Shattering Myths in Jewish Philosophy » in Jospe,
Raphael (éd) Paradigms in Jewish Philosophy, Associated University Press, pp. 112-128.
2008   Jewish Philosophy: Foundations and Extensions. Volume two: On Philosophers and Their Thought,
University Press of America, Lanham.
Koppel, Moshe
1997   Meta-halakha. Logic, Intuition, and the Unfolding of the Jewish Law, Jason Aronson Inc., Londres.
2003   « Resolving Uncertainty: A Unified Overview of Rabbinic Methods », Tradition, 37/1.
Three Moments in Jewish Philosophy
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 22 | 2011
10
Lebens, Samuel
forthcoming   « Foundational Questions for a New Era in the Philosophy of Judaism ».
forthcoming   « How to Cut a Sentence into Bits: Law and Logic in the Talmud and Beyond ».
Lellouche, Raphaël
2006   Difficile Levinas. Peut-on ne pas être levinassien ?, L’éclat, « Tiré à part », Paris /Tel Aviv.
Lewinsohn, Jed
2007   « Philosophy in Halakha: The Case of Intentional Action », The Torah u-Madda Journal,
2007/14, pp. 97-136. 
Melamed, Yitzhak Y.
2009   « Salomon Maimon et l’échec de la philosophie juive moderne », Revue germanique
internationale, 2009/9, pp. 175-187.
Nordmann, Sophie
2007   « Judaïsme et paganisme chez Cohen, Rosenzweig et Levinas. Un ‘geste spéculatif’
commun », Centre Sèvres. Archives de Philosophie, 2007/2, pp. 227-247.
Putnam, Hilary
2008   Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein, Indiana University
Press.
Seeskin, Kenneth
1991   « Jewish Philosophy in the 1980’s », Modern Judaism, 1991/11, pp. 157-172.
Stern, Josef
1987   « Modes of Reference in the Rituals of Judaism », Religious Studies, 23/1, pp. 109-128.
Westerkam, Dirk
2008   « The Philonic Distinction: German Enlightenment Historiography of Jewish Thought », 
History and Theory, 2008/47, pp. 533-559.
NOTES
1. Philo of Alexandria is thought to be one of the first Jewish philosophers: this Hellenistic Jew
attempted to harmonize Judaism and philosophy. Though Philo focused on Jewish texts, which he
interpreted thanks to philosophical concepts,  his work influenced the early Christian writers
more than the Jewish thinkers. 
2. Gérard  Bensussan  insists  on  the  a  priori  incompatibility  and  the  heterogeneity  between
Judaism and philosophy (Bensussan 2001).
3. About the relevance of Guttman’s book today (Guttmann 1933), see Steven Harvey’s article
(Harvey 2007).
4. I have taken the liberty of establishing this opposition on the basis of Samuel Lebens’ articles,
to be published. The texts of other authors, who have explained these ideas more in depth, are
worth referring to. 
5. “We can then say that there is a Greek moment in the history of Jewish philosophy, and there
is a Medieval-Arab moment and a Modern-German moment, if we want to mention only the three
most remarkable sequences, the three configurations in which the practice of translation has had
the biggest impact on what is at stake when images are being turned into concepts” (Bensussan
2001: 389).
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6. Regarding  Mendelsohn,  whose  philosophical  activity  predates  the  opposition  between
Hegelian  and  anti-Hegelian  thinkers,  one  should  refer  to  Dominique  Bourel’s  book,  which
presents Mendelsohn’s relation to the ideas of the German Enlightenment (Bourel 2004).
7. According to Adlerblum, Samson Raphael Hirsch was inspired by Fichte’s works (Adlerblum
1917: 183).
8. Lellouche criticizes this type of anti-Hegelianism: “it seems that from Rosenzweig to Levinas
and Benny Lévy, the ‘Jewish thought’ got enmeshed into the net of anti-Hegelianism and now
needs to get disentangled” (Lellouche 2006: 125).
9. Lellouche  writes  that  although  Lévinas  did  not  fully  understand  Heidegger’s  thought
(Lellouche  2006:  152),  Lévinas’  philosophy had more  in  common with  Heidegger’s  than with
Husserl’s (Lellouche 2006: 73 et 108).
10. Maurice-Ruben Hayoun raises the question about Jewish philosophy today: “But what about
[Jewish philosophy] today? Well, thanks to a peculiar swing of the pendulum – a trademark of
Jewish history – Paris  and more generally the French-speaking world are taking the matters
over” (Hayoun 2005 : 151).
11. Regarding the connection between Lévinas’  work and halakha,  the reader should refer to
Michael Fagenblat (Fagenblat 2008).
12. Kenneth Seeskin states that according to Buber the I/Thou opposition has more to do with
intuitions  than  with  theoretical  concepts:  “the  I/Thou  relationship  is  based  on  a  series  of
intuitions rather than a theoretical apparatus” (Seeskin 1991: 161).
13. Husik’s  concluding  words  echo  Melamed’s  thought  about  the  post-Medieval  Jewish
philosophy:  “There have appeared philosophers among the Jews in succeeding centuries,  but
they  either  philosophized  without  regard  to  Judaism  and  in  opposition  to  its  fundamental
dogmas, thus incurring the wrath and exclusion of the synagogue, or they sought to dissociate
Judaism from theoretical speculation on the ground that the Jewish religion is not a philosophy
but a rule of conduct. In more recent times, Jewry has divided itself into sects and under the
influence of modern individualism has lost its central authority making every group the arbiter
of its own belief and practice and narrowing the religious influence to matters of ceremony and
communal activity of a practical character. There are Jews now and there are philosophers, but there
are no Jewish philosophers and there is no Jewish philosophy” (Husik 1916: 431-432, I highlight).
14. The format of this article is such that I cannot give a detailed presentation of the thought of
every modern Jewish philosopher, not even the major ones.
15. The current opposition between analytic and continental philosophies shouldn’t mask their
commonalities in terms of their origin (Dummett 1993, Benoist 2001).
16. Pascal  Engel’s  La  dispute is  an  excellent  introduction  to  the  opposition  between  the
continental and the analytic philosophies (Engel 1997). Whatever their field of expertise, analytic
philosophers all receive an academic training emphasizing argumentation. I have chosen to refer
to this type of philosophy as “analytic” rather than “Anglo-Saxon” since authors who write in
other languages than English have also adopted the analytic style.
17. Seeskin does not see any great Jewish philosopher in the contemporary Anglo-Saxon world: “
The analytic movement that dominated Anglo-American departments for the greater part of this
century had little impact on Jewish thought. There is no one who stands to Jewish philosophy as
Alvin Plantinga, Philip Quinn, or Ninian Smart stand to Christian” (Seeskin 1991: 164). 
18. Studying the various  types  of  arguments  is  of  course  quite  fruitful.  Several thinkers  co-
authored an article on the a fortiori argument in the Talmud (Abraham, Gabbay, and Schild 2009).
For the kelal ufrat argument, see Abraham, Gabbay, Hazut, Maruvka, and Schild 2011.
19. Personally, I think that Goodman’s semiotics may also explain many characteristics of the
vocabulary pertaining to the Talmudic legal system. 
20. Koppel is very cautious: he does not say that halakha actually is autonomous but that this
assumption helps us understand the development of the Jewish law.
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21. The  readers  who  might  be  interested  in  reading  unpublished  articles  may  refer  to  the
following website: http://www.theapj.com. It posts announcements of debates conducted on line
in the analytic tradition: questions and criticisms are addressed to the author and are followed
by argumentative exchanges on the topics raised. 
22. Lellouche says that  Lévinas “refuses argumentation” and that with him, “rhetoric  comes
back,” although Lellouche also acknowledges the “poetic qualities” of this philosopher (Lellouche
2006: 109).
23. Hilary Putnam, one of the most important thinkers of analytic philosophy today, dedicated
one of his books to Judaism. Although he usually debates with the majority of the great analytic
philosophers,  he  chooses  in  this  work  to  address  such  philosophers  as  Rosenzweig,  Buber,
Wittgenstein, and Lévinas (Putnam 2008). 
24. Regarding Jewish philosophy, Seeskin wrote in 1991: “I submit that the most important work
over the next decade will be constructive and argumentative” (Seeskin 1991: 167).
INDEX
Keywords: Jewish philosophy, Jewish thought, Arab philosophy, Analytic philosophy, Talmud,
Lévinas (Emmanuel), Koppel (Moshe)
AUTHORS
STEFAN GOLTZBERG
Université Libre de Bruxelles, CRFJ scholarship
Three Moments in Jewish Philosophy
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 22 | 2011
13
